Threat Modeling with STRIDE

1. Spoofing

  • Threat: Unauthorized entities impersonating legitimate users or services.
  • Case: Vulnerability “Adding accounts for just the system account adds auth bypass” ( GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23 ) indicates potential for spoofing threats.
  • Mitigation: Implement robust authentication mechanisms, ensuring the use of secure credentials and authentication tokens.

2. Tampering

  • Threat: Unauthorized modification of data or configurations.
  • Case 1: Issue “Arbitrary file write by JetStream-enabled users” ( GHSA-6h3m-36w8-hv68 ) shows the risk of data tampering.
  • Case 2: CVE-2022-26652 describes a vulnerability in NATS nats-server ( CVE-2022-26652 ).
  • Mitigation: Implement access controls, integrity checks, and promptly apply security patches to prevent tampering.

3. Repudiation

  • Threat: Actors denying their actions, lacking traceability or accountability.
  • Case: Issue “fatal error: concurrent map read and map write” ( GitHub Issue #4807 ) highlights the importance of robust logging.
  • Mitigation: Implement comprehensive logging and auditing mechanisms to trace user actions and system changes.

4. Information Disclosure

  • Threat: Unauthorized access to sensitive information.
  • Case: The absence of a detailed security policy could lead to lapses in handling sensitive information securely.
  • Mitigation: Establish and enforce a rigorous security policy, encrypt sensitive data, and use TLS for secure communications.

5. Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Threat: Disruption of service availability.
  • Case 1: Vulnerability “Import loops in account imports, nats-server DoS” ( GHSA-gwj5-3vfq-q992 ) and “Nil dereference in NATS JWT, DoS” ( GHSA-hmm9-r2m2-qg9w ) indicate DoS risks.
  • Case 2: Issue “Increasing memory consumption” ( GitHub Issue #4822 ) could lead to service degradation.
  • Mitigation: Implement rate limiting, error handling, resource management, and scalable system design.

6. Elevation of Privilege

  • Threat: Unauthorized users gaining elevated access or privileges.
  • Case: Vulnerabilities like “Unconstrained account assumption by authenticated clients” ( GHSA-g6w6-r76c-28j7 ) and “Import token permissions checking not enforced” ( GHSA-j756-f273-xhp4 ) show potential for privilege escalation.
  • Mitigation: Enforce the principle of least privilege, audit permissions, and segregate duties.

Additional Concerns

  • Issues like “TLS missing ciphersuite settings when CLI flags used” ( GHSA-jj54-5q2m-q7pj ) and “Incorrect handling of credential expiry by NATS Server” ( GHSA-2c64-vj8g-vwrq ) highlight the need for secure communications and timely credential management.
  • Other operational issues include “Messages stop being delivered to a consumer” ( GitHub Issue #4736 ) and “Inconsistent reads for R3 KV” ( GitHub Issue #4710 ).

After analyzing the vulnerabilities and issues in the NATS system using the STRIDE framework, it appears that STRIDE is indeed a useful and effective method for identifying and categorizing potential security threats in NATS.

Threat Modeling with DREAD

Damage Potential

  • Assessment: Evaluates the potential impact or harm a successful exploitation of a vulnerability could cause, including data loss, service disruption, financial loss, or reputation harm.
  • Context in NATS: High severity vulnerabilities like arbitrary file write could lead to significant data breaches or system compromise, indicating high damage potential.

Reproducibility

  • Assessment: Measures how consistently a vulnerability can be exploited. The more reliable the reproduction of the threat, the greater the risk.
  • Context in NATS: Some vulnerabilities may require specific conditions or knowledge to exploit, affecting their reproducibility. Less complex and more documented vulnerabilities have higher reproducibility.

Exploitability

  • Assessment: Refers to the ease with which an attacker can exploit a vulnerability. Influenced by the need for specialized knowledge, tools, or access privileges.
  • Context in NATS: Vulnerabilities like auth bypass might be more easily exploitable compared to those requiring in-depth understanding or access.

Affected Users

  • Assessment: Evaluates how many and which users are impacted by the vulnerability. The broader the user base affected, the higher the risk.
  • Context in NATS: Considering NATS’s role in various applications, a significant vulnerability could affect a wide range of users, especially those heavily reliant on NATS for communication.

Discoverability

  • Assessment: Determines how easily a potential attacker can find and understand a vulnerability. Publicly known and documented vulnerabilities are more discoverable.
  • Context in NATS: Vulnerabilities that are documented and made public, such as through GitHub security advisories, have higher discoverability, increasing the likelihood of attempted exploits.

Note: We used a cobination of two seperate models for a more comprehensive threat analysis